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Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance
Mechanisms: Conceptualizing Fragmented




Conceptualizing how private actors can and should control their
supply chains is a tricky question with both economic and legal
dimensions. The topic is of extreme importance in today's global
economy. On the one hand, this importance is highlighted by events such
as the catastrophic and deadly collapse of the Rana Plaza factory
building in Bangladesh and the economic fiasco of the Olkiluoto 3
nuclear power plant construction project in Finland, both arguably
caused by the lack of effective supply chain governance. On the other
hand, the potential benefits of successful supply chain governance, shown
by examples uch as open book accounting in automotive manufacturing,
provide another perspective on the importance of focusing on supply
chain governance. In this paper, I provide a framework for
conceptualizing supply chain governance from a legal perspective. First,
I combine the governance analytics of global value chain theory with
research into compliance mechanisms and practical examples of contract
boundary spanning governance mechanisms. This provides a
preliminary typology that helps distinguish between adequate and
inadequate governance mechanisms. Second, in contractually organized
supply chains, governance mechanisms necessarily transgress contract
boundaries and thus privity. This leads me to refer to them as contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanisms. To help conceptualize the
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requirements for attributing legal normative effects to such mechanisms,
I propose using Teubner's factual framework for evaluating liability in
contract networks. Combined together, the typology and the framework
provide a tool for evaluating and discussing the appropriateness of
liability in different factual situations. This tool is not limited to any
specific jurisdiction or doctrine and is thus trans-substantive. It enables
further comparison of the legal doctrines available in different
jurisdictions and transnationally for their potential in establishing
liability in different configurations of supply chain governance.
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR CONTRACT-BOUNDARY-SPANNING
GOVERNANCE
Fragmentation and globalization pose major challenges to contract
law. This is illustrated by recent events like the catastrophic collapse of
the Rana Plaza building, which claimed the lives of over a thousand
factory workers, ' and the economic fiasco of the Olkiluoto 3 (OL3)
nuclear power plant in Finland, which has resulted in a decade's delay
and multibillion euro arbitration claims.2 One common denominator in
both cases is the challenge of implementing effective contract-boundary-
spanning governance mechanisms in fragmented and globalized
structures of production.
By contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms, I refer to
the increasingly sophisticated mechanisms that are used by private
actors to govern chains or networks of contracts for a particular
purpose. From a traditional perspective, contracts create boundaries
between actors that define their respective rights and obligations. The
fragmentation and globalization of production, however, put pressure on
actors to revise this framework. While keeping the advantages of
contract boundaries, for example in relation to limiting liability, actors
may at the same time wish to overcome these boundaries in order to
better control the whole chain or network of production, for example in
relation to ethical production practices, cost-effectiveness, or ability to
1. See, e.g., Editorial, One Year After Rana Plaza, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/one-year-after-rana-plaza.html.
For a more victim-oriented perspective, see Jason Motlagh, The Ghosts of Rana Plaza,
VQR (2014), available at http://www.vqronline.org/reporting-articles/2014/04/ghosts-rana-
plaza. For more discussion, see Section II.A infra.
2. See, e.g., Jussi Rosendahl, Update 2-Finland's Nuclear Plant Start Delayed
Again; Areva, TVO Trade Blame, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2014, 6:54 AM), available at
http:lwww. reuters.com/article/finland-nuclear-olkiluoto-idUSLNOR20CV20140901. For
more discussion, see Section II.A infra.
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innovate.3 This desire comes into conflict with the doctrine of privity of
contracts, which some actors may try to simultaneously employ and
evade to their advantage.
4
In Part I, I introduce the problems of production, as fragmented by
sourcing and subcontracting into chains or networks of entities
connected by bilateral contracts, in a globalized context where vastly
different regulatory and enforcement frameworks may apply to different
actors of the same production chain or network.5 I then use global value-
chain (GVC) theory and its typology of value-chain governance as one
example of how to conceptualize the governance of fragmented and
globalized production over contract boundaries. Finally, to see how the
3. For an example of the diverse ways in which actors try to spread ethical values
in production chains and the problems that they face, see generally RICHARD M. LOCKE,
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 126-55 (2013). Locke's general gist that actors must work together over
contract lines to effectively promote ethical behavior can be contrasted with the regulatory
and legal challenges related to ethical values, in particular the conventional notion that
an actor who contractually requires another party to follow certain ethical standards
prima facie has all the legal trumps in her hand if the other party does not follow these
standards. See generally Ingeborg Schwenzer & Benjamin Leisinger, Ethical Values and
International Sales Contracts, in COMMERCIAL LAW CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
JAN HELLNER IN MEMORIAM 249 (Ross Cranston et al. eds., 2007). For an example of cost
management, see generally Peter Kajuter & Harri I. Kulmala, Open-Book Accounting in
Networks: Potential Achievements and Reasons for Failures, 16 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 179
(2005). For an example of innovative R&D, see generally Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Contracting -for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009).
4. The aftermath of the Rana Plaza disaster provides a recent example. In the wake of
the catastrophe, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was undertaken by
numerous first world companies to effectively implement worker safety measures in
Bangladeshi factories. A number of North American companies, however, saw this
instrument as potentially opening up too many liabilities due to it being an enforceable
agreement between companies and their suppliers' workers' representatives and thus
establishing privity between the two. See, e.g., Benjamin Hensler and Jeremy Blasi,
Making Global Corporations' Labor Rights Commitments Legally Enforceable: The
Bangladesh Breakthrough, WORKER'S RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (June 18, 2013), available at
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/recommended-reading/making-global-corporations
2019-labor-rights-commitments-legally-enforceable-the-bangladesh-breakthrough; Steven
Greenhouse, U.S. Retailers See Big Risk in Safety Plan for Factories in Bangladesh, N.Y.
TIMES (May 22, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 05/23lbusiness/legal-
experts-debate-us-retailers-risks-of-signing-bangladesh-accord.html?_r=-0. Instead, the
North American companies decided to utilize another instrument, the Alliance on
Bangladesh Worker Safety, which would try to achieve the same results as the Accord
without creating privity between these companies and their suppliers' workers. I discuss
these instruments in more detail in Section II.A infra.
5. For a discussion of the terms "fragmentation" and "globalization," see Gary Gereffi
et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 78, 79-82 (2005).
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typology developed under GVC theory might be combined with existing
research on private compliance, I discuss Richard Locke's recent account
of private compliance mechanisms. My aim here is to provide a
preliminary typology of contract-boundary-spanning governance that
can be used to examine the mechanisms at play in the private
governance of production.
In Part II, I examine how the typology identified in Part I may be
used to understand and critique how companies control production in
the context of three case studies. The first is the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh ("Bangladesh Accord"). Here, a dedicated
governance contract was created to resolve problems in the underlying
chain of bilateral contracts. The second is the open-book accounting
practices of German automotive production. Here, governance is not
based on a dedicated governance contract. Instead, more general
requirements of cooperation "cascade" down the chain of contracts.
These requirements are complemented by various context-sensitive
courses of action for improving the functioning of the chain. The third is
the ongoing OL3 nuclear power plant construction project in Finland.
Here, it seems that inadequate governance has contributed to the severe
dysfunctionality of the chain structure. To conclude Part I, I briefly
examine the difficulties that adequate contract-boundary-spanning
governance poses from a legal doctrinal perspective and how the
typology set out in Part I can help.
In Part III, I examine two problems that contract-boundary-
spanning governance mechanisms pose for the doctrine of privity of
contracts. In place of chains of purely bilateral contracts, contract-
boundary-spanning governance entails a move toward overlapping
layers of governance that extend the control of actors over a whole chain
of bilateral contracts. The first is whether a dispute should be subsumed
under one or more of the bilateral contracts of the chain, under the
contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanism, or both. The
second is how an actor may challenge a contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanism without privity. While the answer depends on
the specific situation and applicable rules of law, I propose using the
typology presented in Part I to complement the factual framework used
by Gunther Teubner for evaluating which relationships are legally
meaningful enough to overcome the limits of privity. This results in a
trans-substantive analytical tool for studying the legal effects of
contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms that may thus
also have transnational application.
In the Conclusion, I hypothesize on one possible legal cause for the
shift in contract governance from individual contracts to collective
entities of contracts. Previously, contract boundaries have been used to
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limit liability and impose on actors an individualistic operating logic.
Now, developments in national contract laws may be driving a change
in this logic such that more emphasis is placed on the new regulatory
subjectivity of collective entities of contracts. One particular
development may see an increased role for contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanisms in limiting liability, instead of resorting to
contract boundaries.
I. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNING GLOBALLY FRAGMENTED
PRODUCTION
A. Brief Background on Fragmentation and Globalization
We live in a regulation-heavy world where compliance plays a major
role in organizing production. Product safety, labor, environmental, and
other regulations set legal requirements for organizing production.
Further, companies may wish to exert compliance on their suppliers and
subcontractors for other reasons, such as ethics, cost-management, or
research and development (R&D).6 Two trends, the fragmentation and
globalization of production, make compliance governance especially
difficult.
7
Profit-seeking companies are motivated to specialize in their more
lucrative core competencies. This increases pressure to fragment value
chains by bringing some aspects of production in-house while
outsourcing others. For example, companies like Apple concentrate on
design, marketing, and R&D, while leaving manufacturing and
component design mostly to outside suppliers.8
While fragmentation allows companies to concentrate on their core
competencies, it also fragments liability. Corporate and contract law
typically do not impose liability on a company for the conduct of its
contractors or suppliers. Thus companies may have more interest in
6. For an example of ethical values, see generally Schwenzer & Leisinger, supra note
3. For an example of cost management, see generally Peter Kajuter & Harri I. Kulmala,
Open-Book Accounting in Networks: Potential Achievements and Reasons for Failures, 16
MGMT. ACCT. RES. 179 (2005). For an example of innovative R&D, see generally Ronald J.
Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009).
7. See Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. IN'L POL.
ECON. 78, 79-82 (2005).
8. For an illustrative description, see, e.g., Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains in a
Post-Washington Consensus World, 21 REV. INrliL POL. ECON. 9, 20-21 (2013). See also
John Humphrey, Upgrading in Global Value Chains, ILO World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalization Working Paper No. 28, 3-5 (2004).
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whether an outsourced product or service meets requested quality
requirements than in how outsourced production is managed and
organized. While the latter may have an effect on, for example, brand
image or the cost structure of production, it is the end product that often
seems more important than the production process.
With increasingly effective means of transporting goods and
information, the fragmentation of production takes place on a global
scale. The country of production need not have any relation to a
company's country of origin or to the intended market. Again, for
example, Apple, based in the United States, outsources the
manufacturing of its devices to manufacturers operating in China and
elsewhere, while the components used in the devices come from a
number of different source countries.9 At the same time, the devices are
marketed globally to wealthy consumers.
Globalization can distort the regulatory framework in which
production occurs due to differences in regulatory and enforcement
environments across the production chain. Similarly to fragmentation,
when outsourcing production to a third-world country, the key aim of an
outsourcer is to ensure that the end product is competitively priced and
fulfills quality, product safety, and other standards in markets where
the outsourcer runs a considerable risk in relation to brand image or
liability for defects. On the other hand, the procedural aspects of
production, such as environmental and labor impact, are less directly
important to the outsourcer. The effect of procedural aspects of
production may not be as easily visible in countries where the end
product is marketed and may rely, for example, on grassroots action to
come to light. Thus disparities in production-related regulations and
their enforcement may be less of a concern for an outsourcer.
The big picture of fragmentation and globalization is complex and
beyond the scope of the article. Gereffi notes that fragmentation
increasingly seems to be countered through relational contractual
practices between companies that try to secure the sustained
availability of commodities and services.10 Similarly, globalization not
only gives rise to jurisdictions that can be utilized as potential
regulatory loopholes but also to jurisdictions that exert their regulatory
standards beyond their own boundaries."' But no matter how they
shape and reshape themselves, the trends of fragmentation and
9. Id.
10. See Gereffi, supra note 8, at 16.
11. See Dan Danielsen, Local Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy
Perspective, 1 TRANSNATL LEGAL THEORY 49, 52 (2010).
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globalization underlie the governance realities of global production and
thus need to be accounted for.
B. Global Value-Chain Theory as One Answer to the Problem of
Conceptualizing Fragmented Entities
Fragmentation and globalization cause severe difficulties for the
legal conceptualization of production. Due to existing notions of
contractual privity, contract law is chiefly concerned with looking at
individual contracts and the parties to them. Fragmentation and
globalization, however, result in production through chain or network
structures, consisting of several different contracts with several
different actors.
Similar to groups of companies or joint ventures, chain or network
production structures consisting of several contracts between several
actors may have one or more actors in leading positions. The definition
of a lead firm is context dependent, but as a starting point it might be
said that the contracts and other relationships of a lead firm have a
major impact on other actors by narrowing their freedom of choice.
12
Thus while the production structure consists of contracts between
independent entities, the position of the lead firm in relation to the
other companies may be more akin to, for example, the parent company
of a corporate group than to an independent actor.
Understanding fragmented and globalized production thus requires
a methodology that can overcome the limits of privity. Conceptualizing
the relationship of the constituent contracts of a production chain to the
whole is crucial for understanding the relative roles of companies that
are, from a traditional privity perspective, independent actors without a
legally relevant stake in the other actors of the chain.
GVC theory provides one possibility for conceptualizing production
beyond contract boundaries. It is not a legal theory but instead a step in
a succession of economic and political theories used to understand the
12. This effect may be limited to certain actors, such as in the example of contract
structures in U.S. automotive manufacturing described by Omri Ben-Shahar & James J.
White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 953 (2006), or more broadly so that it affects practically all actors, such as in the OL3
scenario discussed in Section II below. For a discussion of the effect of lead firms on
downstream actors and their employers in global garment and electronics industries, see
RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR
STANDARDS INA GLOBAL ECONOMY 126-55 (2013).
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effect of fragmentation and globalization on production.13 The aim of
GVC theory is to understand the sectoral logic of global production (for
example grain trade, electronics production, service providers such as
help-desks). 14 The use of the word "value," in contrast to earlier
theories, such as global commodity-chain theory, emphasizes that not
just the global flows of commodities are in focus, but also how local
value creation is affected. In particular, GVC theory has recently been
used to understand how production affects other values, such as
economic development, welfare, the environment, or social structure.15
According to Gereffi, GVC theory has been used this way by, for
example, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Trade Organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.16
Understanding production from a GVC perspective begins by
examining value chains as entities consisting of linked actors, each in
its own physical and regulatory setting. Instead of studying individual
companies, regulatory actors, or contractual relationships, the focus is
on understanding how the parts affect the whole. How do the actors'
different objectives, capabilities, and regulatory environments affect
their possibilities for controlling production? To this end, GVC theory is
used to develop analytical tools that can be used to compare and
evaluate production as a whole. 17
One example of such a tool is the typology of governance types
proposed by Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon.'8 The typology allows
comparison between value chains based on their private governance
structure. At the same time it shifts the focus from individual
companies and contracts to the effect contracts have on one another in
chain- or network-type production structures. The typology is based on
three factors: the complexity of information required for a transaction;
the extent to which information can be codified in a contract; and the
capabilities of the supplier base.19 Each factor can have a value of either
13. See Jennifer Bair, Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going
Forward, 9 COMPETITION & CHANGE 153, 159-61 (2005).
14. Id. at 162; Gereffi, supra note 8, at 10.
15. Compare, for example, the call for widening the GVC research agenda presented in
Bair, supra note 13, at 167-72, with the review of GVC-related literature almost ten years
later in Gereffi, supra note 8, at 23-28.
16. See Gereffi, supra note 8, at 23.
17. See, e.g., Gereffi, supra note 8, at 20-21 (listing analytic GVC metrics).
18. See Gereffi et al., supra note 5, at 83-88 (identifying five types of GVC governance:
hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market).
19. Id. at 85-87.
CONTRACT-BOUNDARY-SPANNING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 717
"high" or "low." 20 While eight combinations are possible, according to
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, only five exist in practice.
21
At one end of this spectrum of five different governance types are
"market-based relationships"; at the other is "vertical integration."' 22
This reflects the traditional divide between markets and hierarchies in
industrial organization. Governance through arm's length contracts
based on market price mechanisms occurs when production does not
require complex information, transactions are relatively easy to codify,
and supplier capability is high. In such situations little input is needed
from buyers, and capable suppliers are abundantly available.
Governance through vertical integration, on the other hand, occurs
when product complexity is high, the ability to codify transactions is
low, and capable suppliers are not easily available. In such situations,
production often relies on tacitly communicated information and the
coordination of different actors and resources such as intellectual
property rights.
23
Between the more traditional modes of market-based contracts and
vertical integration, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon identify three
additional governance types: "modular," "relational," and "captive"
value-chain governance.
24
In modular value chains, the relationship between a buyer and
suppliers is close to a price-based, market-type structure, the difference
being that the actors share knowledge of common standards. The
complexity of information required for a transaction is high, but, due to
shared standards, the ability to codify the transaction is also high.25
Thus the buyer can rest assured that a capable supply base can
correctly understand its requirements. An example of a modular value
chain is a turnkey business model, where the lead firm can, due to
shared standards, relatively easily order complex products without a
need for overseeing production.
26
Relational value chains may form where shared standards do not
exist. The complexity of information required for a transaction is high
and the lack of shared standards makes the ability to codify the
transaction low, despite a capable supply base.27 In such situations,
20. Id.
21. Id. at 85, 87, endnote 10.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 87.
24. Id. at 86-87.
25. Id. at 86-87.
26. Id. at 97-98.
27. Id. at 86-87.
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cooperation is required between the buyer and supplier to ensure
quality. Due to challenges in codifying the transaction, special
governance mechanisms are required. These can be based on, for
example, mutual trust, reputation, or special contractual
arrangements.28 A relational value chain may exist, for example, in
prototype-related production, such as the development of new products.
Captive value chains may form when both the ability to codify
transactions and product complexity are high but supplier capabilities
relatively low. 29 The supplier's relatively low capabilities make it
dependent on cooperation with the buyer. Similarly, it is difficult for the
supplier to find alternative markets. Ben-Shahar and White's
description of the dependence of outsourced divisions of U.S. automotive
manufacturers on their parent companies is an example of a captive
value chain.
30
Central to Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's typology of value-
chain governance is how value chains may evolve from one governance
type to another.31 This has bearing on how value chain actors can
upgrade their production capabilities. A supplier might, for example, try
to improve its position by migrating from a role in a captive value-chain
structure towards a role in a market or modular structure.
While GVC theory is not a legal concept, Gereffi, Humphrey, and
Sturgeon's typology of value-chain governance deals with the
relationships between actors in contractually structured value chains
and may thus have legal relevance.32 Law and regulation has a major
role in organizing economic production that has hitherto been
underutilized. 33 One particular question that arises is the legal
consequences of a "wrong" choice of value-chain governance. For
example, a lead firm might organize a modular value chain by
contractually requiring all actors to follow its set of standards in
production. If the lead firm does not ensure that its standards are
effectively disseminated among the different actors, should it be liable
for this deficiency, or can it retreat beyond the contract boundary and so
escape liability? To open up the question of law and value-chain
28. Examples of contractual arrangements for value-chain governance are discussed in
Sections 1.C and II infra.
29. Gereffi et al., supra note 5, at 86-87.
30. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 970-78.
31. Gereffi et al., supra note 5.
32. For some general remarks on GVC theory and law, see Kevin B. Sobel-Read, Global
Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 364 (2014).
33. See The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, The Role of Law in
Global Value Chains: A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT'L L. 57 (2016).
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governance, I next tie together the framework proposed by Gereffi,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon with one account of private compliance.
C. Toward a Typology of Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance:
Intertwining GVC Theory with Locke's Account of Private Compliance
The ghost of globalization past sets the stage for Locke's account of
the development of labor compliance in subcontracting in the garment
and electronics industries.34 Here, companies outsourced production to
third-world countries and concentrated only on the end product and its
price, while shutting their eyes to working conditions. To use Gereffi,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon's typology, the starting point, at least in
relation to working conditions, was market-based, value-chain
governance. Products were ordered from the lowest bidder, possibly
located in a vastly different regulatory setting than that of the buyer.
Little, if any, attention was paid to working conditions. Once reports on
poor working conditions began circulating in Western media, companies
started polishing their tarnished images through increasingly
sophisticated measures.
35
The first phase was to implement private labor standards that
value-chain actors were required to comply with. 36 The standards
consisted of codes of conduct drafted by Western lead firms. 37 These
required suppliers to guarantee workers basic rights such as child and
forced labor prohibitions, minimum wages, and freedom of association.
3 8
Suppliers were then required to pass these codes of conduct on to their
own suppliers, the standards cascading down the value chain until all
parties to the chain were subject to them. From the perspective of
working conditions, this can be seen as a move from market-based to
modular governance.
According to Locke, such compliance programs are generally seen as
falling short of their objectives.3 9 He identifies three main reasons for
this shortcoming.40 First, a wide range of factors affects the relative
power of actors, so that a single buyer may not be able to exert its
standards on a powerful supplier.41 Second, the causes of compliance
34. See LoCKE, supra note 3.
35. See id. at 24.
36. See generally id. at 24-45.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 35-45, 66-68.
40. See id. at 28-35.
41. See id. at 32.
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problems may be invisible to factory audits. 42 Audits may even
undermine trust between actors, driving problems further underground.
Third, the traditional approach to enforcing standards with a fear of
sanctions may not be effective in all situations and may even discourage
companies from compliance.43 Companies often follow regulations and
standards, not due to fear of sanctions, but instead because they have
been educated or assisted to do so in their everyday affairs. Following
Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's typology, it seems that modular
value-chain governance based on shared standards was not successful
due to the lack of shared standards in practice. A more relational
governance model, with emphasis on creating implementable standards
in practice and not just on paper, can be seen as the next phase of
development.
From the premise that suppliers in the developing world may lack
resources, expertise, and management systems necessary for combating
the root causes of compliance failures, capability-building developed to
supplement traditional compliance programs.44 The idea is to create
shared standards in practice by empowering suppliers and their
employees to promote continuous improvement. Capability-building
builds on traditional compliance programs but emphasizes transparency
through trust and multilateral communication instead of the traditional
compliance model of top-down communication enforced through audits
and sanctions.
Despite their advantages, capability-building programs have their
own challenges due to what Locke sees as three problematic
assumptions.45 The first is that assistance in some areas, for example
industrial or technical upgrading, would lead to improvement in other
areas, such as social upgrading. However, the enforcement of standards
related to, for example, working conditions may have little to do with
profitability or technical sophistication. The second assumption is that
actor interests would be convergent, so that all actors would equally
share an interest in developing working conditions, instead of
concentrating solely on profit maximization. In practice, however,
actors' interests may be widely divergent, and it may be difficult to
guarantee that gains from capability-building are spread evenly, instead
of accruing to the benefit of more powerful actors. The third assumption
is the universality of technical, managerial, and organizational changes,
such that features implemented, for example, in U.S. lead firms could be
42. See id. at 33.
43. See id. at 34.
44. Id. at 78-85.
45. See id. at 102-04.
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directly transplanted to other countries and contexts. In practice,
capability-building programs may not be transplantable into other
contexts without more but must first be adapted to fit local social and
cultural realities.
Locke identifies two further factors that could promote effective
compliance: accounting for the upstream practices of lead firms, and
public regulation and its enforcement.46 First, lead-firm practices have a
crucial effect on production. Lead firms cannot simply impose
obligations on other actors; they must also support the whole by their
own conduct. For example, unpredictable product life cycles may
translate to cyclical changes in production that may in turn require the
use of short-term labor, which increases risks of poor labor practices. As
a solution, Locke proposes a more equal sharing of risks and gains
through more collaborative relationships between actors. 47 Second,
public regulation also has a central role in supporting private
compliance. While public actors can be efficient in creating regulation,
effective enforcement may prove difficult. According to Locke, private
governance mechanisms seem to work best when complementing and
complemented by public mechanisms, so that each gains from the
institutional support of the other.48 The Bangladesh Accord49 may be
seen as a practical example of this further phase of development
proposed by Locke.
In sum, Locke traces several stages of development in private
compliance mechanisms. These different stages of development can be
mapped onto Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's types of value-chain
governance. Using Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's typology that
identifies what kinds of governance types typically are effective in
prescribed situations, a level of legal normativity may be extrapolated.
In other words, if one governance type seems inadequate in a particular
situation, then legal consequences might be attached to the use of
inadequate governance. However, the fit must be seen for the moment
as very preliminary.
First, Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's discussion of their
typology remains on a general level. Providing concrete examples of
contractual and other governance mechanisms, as I have done here
through Locke's discussion, helps us better conceptualize the different
governance types from a potentially normative, and thus also a legally
relevant, perspective. Conversely, the typology enables a move towards
46. See id. at 126-55, 156-73.
47. See id. at 153-55.
48. See id. at 64-68, 169-73.
49. Discussed in Section II.A infra.
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a legally relevant classification of the different mechanisms described by
Locke. Nonetheless, even more concretization of Gereffi, Humphrey, and
Sturgeon's typology will probably be needed for legal application.
Second, the different mechanisms and approaches referred to by
Locke also constitute fuzzy, and potentially broad, categories. Like
contracts, the mechanisms used for contract-boundary-spanning
governance exist in countless different forms. For example, I categorized
Locke's capability-building under Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon's
relational value governance. The further developments proposed by
Locke, the integration of lead-firm practices and public regulation into
governance mechanisms, would fall into the same category of relational
governance. This creates a broad set of different techniques crammed
into a single category that could perhaps be refined into subcategories.
Nonetheless, even the existing typology of governance forms seems
descriptive enough to be useful, as I show below. 50
To be sure, additional research on the suitability and practical effect
of the approach discussed here is needed. As a preliminary step, in Part
II I examine a number of contract-boundary-spanning mechanisms in
practice and what kinds of legal interventions they might accommodate.
II. CONTRACT-BOUNDARY-SPANNING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN
PRACTICE
A. Governing with a Dedicated Governance Contract: The Case of the
Bangladesh Accord
As an example of a dedicated governance contract I examine the
Bangladesh Accord.5 1 The Bangladesh Accord followed the Rana Plaza
catastrophe that took place in 2013 in Bangladesh.5 2 Rana Plaza, a
50. See Section II infra.
51. Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, May 13, 2013, available at
http://www.achact.be/upload/files/BangladeshAccordon-fire and-building-safety-2013.p
df.
52. See generally ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH,
http://www.bangladeshaccord.org (last visited July 15, 2015). For additional general
information on the Rana Plaza disaster (also called the Savar Building collapse), the
search term "Rana Plaza" may be used in various news sites. See generally N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). For scholarly discussion, see, for
example, Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing
the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1 (2013); Beryl ter Haar and Maarten Keune, One Step Forward or
More Window-Dressing? A Legal Analysis of Recent CSR Initiatives in the Garment
Industry in Bangladesh, 30 INT'L J. COMP. LABOUR L. & INDUS. REL. 5 (2014).
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building that housed a number of garment factories, was not in
compliance with local fire and building codes.5 3 It collapsed, causing
over a thousand deaths.5 4 The catastrophe drew global media attention
to third-world working conditions. This in turn led to strong responses
from companies utilizing Bangladeshi suppliers, with some even
threatening to boycott Bangladesh due to perceptions that the state was
unable to prevent such catastrophes.
55
Such solutions might only have moved the problem elsewhere. Thus
a number of companies responded by drafting the Bangladesh Accord in
cooperation with global and local labor unions. It requires parties to
fund and implement at their supplier factories a program on fire and
building safety.56 At the same time, the Bangladesh Accord requires
parties to cooperate with the Bangladesh government's National Action
Plan on Fire Safety.57 Other actors, such as the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and nongovernmental organizations, are
incorporated as witnesses, while the ILO also has a role in governing
the Bangladesh Accord. Actual parties include global and local labor
unions and numerous brand-name companies such as Adidas, Benetton,
and H&M.58
From the perspective of value-chain governance, the most
interesting aspect is how the Bangladesh Accord takes into account the
collateral effects of enforcing fire and construction standards. For
example, parties must require their supplier factories to keep workers
employed with regular pay when a factory closes for renovation, so long
as this period is no longer than six months. 59 The parties must also
make reasonable efforts to ensure that any workers whose employment
is terminated due to a loss of orders at a factory that refuses to
undertake repairs are offered employment with safe suppliers.60 In case
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. For some immediate corporate responses before the full scope of the catastrophe
was evident, see Steven Greenhouse, Bangladesh Fears an Exodus of Apparel Firms, N.Y.
TimSm (May 2, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/business/factory-
owners-in-bangladesh-fear-firms-will-exit.html?pagewanted=all. For a more meditated
"legal" perspective, see Wendy Wysong, When It's So Broke, You Can't Fix It: The Decision
Not to Do Business in Highly Corrupt Countries, CLIFFORD CHANCE (June 23, 2014),
available at http://www.lexology.com/r.ashx?i=2567537&l=7LHHCPO.
56. See Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. For a current list of signatories and witnesses, see About: Signatories, ACCORD ON
FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 52.
59. See Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, supra note 51.
60. Id.
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of disputes, a trade union, for example, may start arbitration
proceedings against a company in breach of the accord.61 Thus under the
Bangladesh Accord parties have contractual obligations to actors that
normally would not be their direct contractual partners in a value chain.
In effect, the Bangladesh Accord creates a direct contractual
relationship between lead firms and their suppliers' workers and worker
representatives.
The Bangladesh Accord seems to have increased workplace safety in
Bangladesh factories falling under the scope of the agreement, but it
has not managed to avoid controversies resulting from the different
interests of buyers, suppliers, and workers.62 At the same time, it has
received a competitor in the form of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
Safety, which weighs the interests of the actors involved very differently
than does the Bangladesh Accord.63 In particular, the Alliance does not
create a direct contractual relationship between lead firms and their
suppliers' workers.
Whatever its practical effect will ultimately be, the Bangladesh
Accord has fundamentally changed the governance of the underlying
contractual structure. First, it creates a contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanism that brings together the interests of actors that
previously would not have been in direct contract in a value chain:
different buyer companies, factories that supply them, and the factories'
employees. Second, it takes into account the actions of the lead firms by
placing on them a contractual duty to care for supplier employees
affected by the implementation of standards required by a lead firm.
Third, it takes into account the Bangladeshi government's national
action plan and also integrates the ILO into its framework, fusing public
and private initiatives into one mechanism.
Most interestingly from a legal perspective, the Bangladesh Accord
is an example of a dedicated governance contract that exists to
complement the contractually organized production chain from lead
firms through various middle actors to factory employees. However, the
scope of the Bangladesh Accord, limited to the fire and building safety of
supplier factories, makes it a very narrow instrument. Due to its narrow
scope, the Bangladesh Accord does not create a truly open contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanism between the different
61. Id.
62. See Steven Greenhouse & Julfikar Ali Manik, Stalemate over Garment Factory
Safety in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25, 2014, http://nyti.ms/IllevTM1.
63. See generally ALLIANCE ON BANGLADESH WORKER SAFETY, http://www.bangladesh
workersafety.org (last visited July 15, 2015). For scholarly discussion and comparison to
the Accord, see Beryl ter Haar and Maarten Keune, supra note 52.
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actors. It only takes into account the issues or interests specifically
mentioned in the agreement, leaving out others that have not received
similar levels of media attention.
B. Governing Without a Dedicated Governance Contract: The Case of a
German Automotive Original Equipment Manufacturer
A different approach from that of the Bangladesh Accord is taken by
contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms that do not
employ dedicated governance contracts. One example is provided by
KajUter and Kulmala's research on open-book accounting.64 Open-book
accounting refers to practices where actors involved in the same
production chain share with one another production-related cost
information.65 This is done to understand and develop production from
an overall perspective. In one case examined by Kajiuter and Kulmala,
the incorporation of open-book practices resulted in a particular
contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanism between a German
automotive original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and its value
chain. Kajiuter and Kulmala's study was not juridical in nature, but a
number of legal insights can be taken from their work.
In order to govern the cost-effectiveness of its value chain, a German
automobile OEM agreed with its key suppliers on open-book accounting
practices. 66 This was done to identify cost-reduction opportunities.
These suppliers were then expected to pass on the practice to their own
suppliers, collecting and sharing information from actors with which the
OEM had no bilateral relationship. This provides the OEM with a
"value chain flow chart," a map containing the names and locations of
various tiers of suppliers, the flow of material between them, and the
value added at each stage. The value chain flow chart provides the OEM
with a detailed view of value-generation that spans the value chain and
is not just limited to its bilateral contractual partners. Such a
mechanism makes it possible to identify and target governance
measures where needed in the value chain.
According to Kajiuter and Kulmala, the OEM uses a number of
techniques in order to make it more feasible for the different actors of
the value chain to share sensitive cost information.67 These include,
first, the establishing of working groups consisting of members from
64. See Kajilter & Kulmala, supra note 3, at 186-90.
65. Id. at 182-84.
66. See id. at 187-90.
67. See id.
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both the OEM and a supplier, which promotes interpersonal trust.6 8
Second, the OEM provides cost-free technical support in the form of
process analysis and optimization.69 Third, the OEM develops dedicated
tools for the disclosure and analysis of information.70 Finally, how the
benefits gained from these practices are shared depends on factors such
as whether the actor receiving the benefit can use the beneficial
processes in its contracts with buyers other than the OEM.71
A crucial difference between the Bangladesh Accord and the open-
book practices discussed here is the legal form of the contract-boundary-
spanning governance mechanism. While the Bangladesh Accord takes
the form of a dedicated governance contract with its own enforcement
mechanism, the open-book approach discussed here relies on cascading
contract terms. There is no single dedicated governance contract to
connect the relevant actors of the value chain and guarantee them a
unified forum for dispute resolution and enforcement. Despite this, the
OEM has a considerable amount of access to potentially sensitive
information on actors that it does not have a direct contractual
relationship with. Furthermore, the structure in place enables it to
directly affect these actors despite the lack of a clearly defined bilateral
contract. Finally, there is no single set form for the ensuing cooperation.
What seems to be a general contractual requirement of adopting open-
book accounting is complemented by context-sensitive action. Thus,
while still limited in scope, the contract-boundary-spanning overnance
mechanism in place in the German automobile OEM example is much
more open to alternative considerations and courses of action than the
Bangladesh Accord.
C. Inadequate Governance and Its Consequences: The Case of the
Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power Plant Project
Finally, I turn to the OL3 nuclear power project as an example of
how the typology discussed in Part I might help identify inadequate
governance. OL3 is the first nuclear reactor built in Finland after a long





72. The newest currently operating nuclear reactors in Finland were constructed in the
1970s. For the history of nuclear construction for the commercial production of electricity
in Finland, see Magnus Hellstrom et al., Project Governance and Path Creation in the
Early Stages of Finnish Nuclear Power Projects, 31 INT'L J. PROJECT MGMT. 712 (2013).
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running in 2009 but now seems delayed until 2018 if not later.73 The
main parties are locked in multibillion-euro arbitration proceedings.
Because of the large amount of publicly available information, in
particular two reports prepared by the Finnish Sateilyturvakeskus
(Finnish Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority (FNRSA)), there is
relatively ample material available for general discussion of the OL3
value-chain structure and its problems.7 4 I will not discuss the project
and its regulatory setting in detail here, as I have done so elsewhere.
75
Instead, what follows is a summary intended to highlight value-chain
governance aspects.
Nuclear power is often viewed with reservation. The effects of a
nuclear accident may be devastating, as seen most recently in
Fukushima. 76 Storing nuclear waste has its own difficulties.
Nonetheless, society demands increasing amounts of carbon-free
73. For a brief overview of recent developments regarding the dispute, delay, and
damages claims in English, see, for example, Jussi Rosendahl, Update 2-Finland's Nuclear
Plant Start Delayed Again; Areva, TVO Trade Blame, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/finland-nuclear-olkiluoto-idUSL5NOR2OCV20140901; Jussi
Rosendahl, Areva-Siemens Raises Claim to $4.4 Billion over Finnish Reactor Delays,
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-olkiluoto-
idUSKCNOIE06A20141025.
74. The FNRSA reports are available in English translation. See SATEILYTURVAKESKUS
(STUK), MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN SUBCONTRACTING DURING THE
OLKILUOTO 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION PHASE (Jan. 2006), available at
http://w3-x.net/rmi/rh/download/ar-6649-6882-4944_STUKBerichtOlkiluoto.pdf
[hereinafter STUK 2006]; SATEILYTURVAKESKUS (STUK), INVESTIGATION OF THE
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDG) AND RELATED
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE OLKILUOTO 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT
(May 2011), available at https://www.stuk.fi/ documents/88234/148256/OL3-EDG-
investigation-report.pdf/15eb63a9-90ac-44c4-8953-e8f89b72b2d8 [hereinafter STUK
2011]. For English overviews of the reports, see Press Release, Siiteilyturvakeskus
(STUK), Insufficient Guidance of Subcontractors' Work in Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power
Plant Project (Dec. 7, 2006), available at https://www.stuk.fi/ web/en/topics/nuclear-
faciity-projects/olkiluoto-3/news-concerning-olkiluoto-3/insufficient-guidanceof-
subcontractors-work-in-olkiluoto-3-nuclear-power-plant-project; Press Release,
Saiteilyturvakeskus (STUK), The Procurement of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)




75. See Jaakko Salminen, Sirpaloituneen sopimusrakenteen hallitseminen ja
kaksiasianosaissuhde [Control of Fragmented Contractual Structures and the Bounds of
Privity], LAKIMIES 482, 495-503 (2015) (Fin.) (English translation on file with author).
76. For general information on the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the search term
"Fukushima" may be used in various news sites. See generally N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
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electricity, of which nuclear power is one source, leading to a balancing
between the interests of safety and carbon-free electricity. Due to the
major risks related to it, nuclear construction is tightly regulated. In
Finland, a key regulatory actor is the FNRSA, which sets regulations
governing the construction of nuclear power plants, monitors their
implementation, and decides whether a specific approach complies with
its regulatory requirements.
77
Importantly, all plans and works related to nuclear safety are
subject to the approval of the FNRSA.78 If plans change, new approval is
needed. 79 Further, rather than being set in stone, the FNRSA's
regulations are relatively open guidelines based on a requirement to use
best available technology.80 Thus it is difficult for an actor to know with
certainty whether a given approach will be acceptable, especially if
modifications need to be made. Finally, the FNRSA has an official
relationship only with the licensee (the actor that has received a license
to construct and operate a nuclear power plant). If some other actor,
such as the main contractor, a subcontractor, or a supplier, has a
question on how to interpret regulations, the licensee must forward the
question to the FNRSA for a binding answer.8' If the question comes
from a low-tier subcontractor, it might first have to pass through a long
chain of contracts before even reaching the licensee.8 2
Based on the FNRSA's reports, the licensee (TVO, a Finnish utilities
company) outsourced almost all value-chain governance to the main
contractor (a consortium between the French Areva and the German
Siemens).8 3 This includes responsibility for regulatory compliance of the
power plant, relationships with subcontractors, and site management.8 4
The licensee is in no direct contact with subcontractors, other than
77. See STUK 2006, supra note 74, at 55.
78. Id.
79. See generally STUK 2011, supra note 74, for the issue of erroneously using mass-
produced parts in emergency diesel generators.
80. See Article 7a of the ydinenergialaki (Nuclear Energy Act) (Fin.) and in particular
its travaux prdparatoires (HE 117/2007 vp laiksi ydinenergialain muuttamisesta) (Fin.),
according to which "ydinvoimalaitoksen krytthlupaa tiettyna ajankohtana krsiteltressa
vallinneet hyvdksyttivyyskriteerit eivAt vrlttkmrttr enan prde, kun laitoksen krytbn
hyvrksyttrvyytta arvioidaan myohemprnr ajankohtana. Hyviiksyttrvyys on arvioitava
kasittelyajankohtana vallitsevien edellytysten mukaan" [author's translation:
acceptability criteria in force when evaluating a nuclear license might no longer be
relevant when acceptability is re-evaluated at a later stage. Acceptability must be
evaluated in light of requirements current at the time of re-evaluation].
81. See STUK 2011, supra note 74, at 34-35; STUK 2006, supra note 74, at 57.
82. See, e.g., STUK 2006, supra note 74, at 31.
83. Id. at 40-42.
84. See, e.g., id.
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through its audits. The licensee receives information on project quality
and progress from the main contractor and forwards this information to
the FNRSA. The licensee has only limited possibilities for influencing
the main contractor's choice of suppliers.85 Like the licensee, the main
contractor seems to have outsourced some of the governance of its
subcontracting to its own suppliers.
86
The two FNRSA reports find a number of problems with this
contract structure. The first report, from 2006, focuses on the
dissemination of the FNRSA's safety requirements in three different
scenarios: the pouring of the concrete base slab, the welding of the steel
containment liner, and the acquisition of a polar crane and material
hatch.8 7 The report notes that central actors, such as the licensee and
the main contractor, concentrated on their own internal processes
instead of adopting a value-chain wide perspective. 88 Similarly, the
FNRSA had focused on the licensee rather than the value chain as a
whole, while at the same time concentrating more on the general safety
of devices and structures than interorganizational problems.89 These
factors led to major deficiencies in transmitting the FNRSA's safety
requirements between the different actors.90
The second report, from 2011, focuses on differences in required
methods of control and oversight when comparing a long multinational
procurement chain to a single subcontractor or supplier in the context of
acquiring emergency diesel-power generators.91 The central findings are
similar to the earlier report. First, information flow fragmented within
organizations. For example, an operation might be classified as either
mechanical or electrical work, and experts in either might have little
awareness of the whole.92 Second, information flow fragmented between
organizations. Due to the contract structure, the main contractor had no
official direct contact with the FNRSA, while the licensee could not
communicate directly with the suppliers and subcontractors of the main
contractor.93 The licensee focused on monitoring the main contractor
without being aware of the role of actors in the rest of the value chain.
94
At the same time, actors at the other end of the value chain might even
85. See STUK 2006, supra note 74, at 42.
86. Id. at 29, 32.
87. See id. at 63.
88. Id. at 47-54.
89. Id. at 55-57.
90. See, e.g., id. at 31-35, in relation to the steel containment liner.
91. See STUK 2011, supra note 74, at 4.
92. Id. at 30-34.
93. Id. at 34-35.
94. Id. at 24.
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be unaware that they were participating in the construction of a nuclear
power plant.95 Finally, the FNRSA, licensee, and main contractor ended
up having different views on the interpretation of safety requirements,
for example, in relation to whether mass-produced parts could be used
in certain situations.96
Based on the FNRSA's reports, a number of observations can be
made. First, unlike the governance structures of the Bangladesh Accord
and the German automobile OEM, it is not the licensee but the FNRSA,
a regulatory actor, that primarily sets the standards required from OL3
value-chain actors. Despite this, the licensee can be seen as the lead
firm of the value chain. Unless all actors are aware of how to interpret
and implement the FNRSA's requirements, the licensee cannot avoid
having a role as a crucial information gateway between the FNRSA and
the rest of the value chain. Thus the choices of the licensee in organizing
the value-chain structure have an effect on all other actors.
Second, the role of the FNRSA's standards in OL3 is critical, All
value-chain actors were required to operate under these standards.
However, the FNRSA's standards were open and ambiguous, such that
certainty on how they should be applied in a given situation may
require consultation with the FNRSA. The main contractor or its
suppliers and subcontractors could not always know beforehand to what
extent the FNRSA would approve of a chosen approach. Further, the
requirements of the FNRSA extend to every aspect of nuclear
construction. Finally, any deviation or change in plans or procedures on
the part of one actor could affect the rest of the value chain, in the worst
case rendering the end product unusable and even in the best case
requiring additional work from numerous actors in managing deviations
and requesting the FNRSA to accept them.
Third and finally, despite these factors, the licensee aimed at a
modular value-chain structure in which it would only have a limited
monitoring role. Responsibility for implementing the safety
requirements was left to the rest of the value chain. The problem here is
that under the Finnish regulatory scheme a nuclear power plant is not a
standardizable product. Due to the ensuing lack of shared standards a
modular governance structure does not seem to be a realistic way of
organizing value-chain governance in this context. Difficulties in
implementing the FNRSA's standards should be acknowledged in value-
chain governance, especially as the efficient dissemination of safety
requirements requires cooperation between the FNRSA, the licensee,
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. at 23-27.
CONTRACT-BOUNDARY-SPANNING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 731
and all other actors. Efficient value-chain governance would have
required a means for effective communication and coordination between
the different actors, and thus, in practice, a more relational value-chain
governance structure.
The disputes over liability arising from OL3 seem far from settled.
97
Nonetheless, the OL3 scenario can provide an example of inadequate
contract-boundary-spanning overnance. While some level of contract-
boundary-spanning governance is used, for example in the form of
standards required from the whole value chain and the monitoring of
compliance, the chosen governance mechanism is clearly inadequate for
effectively coordinating the adoption of required standards. The
question then arises whether the choice made by a private actor of
inadequate governance can have legal consequences. This question has
broad implications for other similar situations. For example, the
Bangladesh Accord can be seen as a voluntary response to the
catastrophic consequences of inadequate value-chain governance. In the
next section, I examine possibilities for legal and other responses to
inadequate value-chain governance.
D. Contract-Boundary-Spanning Governance and Legal Normativity
Contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms exist in
diverse forms. I have illustrated some of this diversity through the case
studies above. In the case of the Bangladesh Accord, governance was
founded on a dedicated governance contract that connected various
actors in the underlying chain of bilateral contracts. In the case of the
German automobile OEM, governance was based partly on cascading
certain requirements down a chain of bilateral contracts and partly on
context-sensitive action that actors take on a case-by-case basis, and
which can be directed to any given point in the chain of bilateral
contracts.
With the third example, OL3, the focus is the issue of whether a
lead firm has implemented adequate contract-boundary-spanning
governance. In the OL3 example, the lead firm tried to utilize modular
governance, but this resulted in the failure of the value chain in a
97. Despite speculation in 2015 that there would be a "partial or intermediate award in
the coming months," it seems likely that the current ICC arbitration will drag on for
longer, as no such award has surfaced as of January 2016. See, e.g., Geert De Clercq,
Breakthrough in Areva-TVO Nuclear Dispute Seen This Year-Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 1,
2015), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/areva-finland-idUSL6NOWT4CI20150
401; Jussi Rosendahl, Finland Says Has No Role in Areva-TVO Dispute, REUTERS (Jan.
21, 2016), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/areva-edf-finland-idUSL8N1551SP.
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context where standards could not be unambiguously defined, and
cooperative innovation under a strict regulatory setting was instead
required. The use of a relational contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanism, allowing more coordination and control in
ensuring that the required standards were adequately defined and met,
similar to the Bangladesh Accord or the German OEM example, might
have helped alleviate the severe problems encountered by OL3.
To be sure, three examples do not constitute a large data set.
Nonetheless, they provide some preliminary perspectives for the legal
study of contract-boundary-spanning overnance. Crucially, it seems
that we are dealing with a form of control exerted by lead firms over the
whole value chain, even those with whom they have no direct legal
relationship. The form of governance depends primarily on the interests
of the lead firm or, alternatively in some cases such as OL3, a
regulatory actor. If lead firms or regulators, respectively, are interested
in the functioning of the value chain as a whole, value-chain governance
is more effective than if the rest of the actors are left on their own.
While this is nothing new and echoes Locke's emphasis on the actions of
lead firms and regulators, it provides a starting point for understanding
contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms. Most
importantly, it enables a discussion of whether a poor choice of
governance might have legal consequences under existing normative
structures.
To frame this discussion, I first discuss two "easy" alternatives for
enforcing contract-boundary-spanning overnance. I then turn to the
third and more problematic alternative: legal liability for inadequate
governance choices.
Under the first alternative, private actors are voluntarily interested
in developing the governance of their value chain. One major challenge
related to the voluntary adoption of contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanisms is a fear of blurring liability: if a lead firm
establishes a governance mechanism, A la the Bangladesh Accord or the
German OEM, that connects it directly to various actors along its
production chain, the lead firm may expose itself to liability to more
actors than would be the case under a chain structure with no contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanism.98 Despite this, spectacular
failures of value chains with inadequate governance mechanisms, such
as the Rana Plaza catastrophe or the huge pecuniary claims arising out
of the OL3 fiasco, may provide motivation for considering more efficient
governance mechanisms. On the other hand, the apparent success of
98. See, e.g., Hensler and Blasi, supra note 3.
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such mechanisms in other contexts, such as the German OEM example,
should also provide motivation for their voluntary adoption.
Under the second alternative, a regulatory actor would have an
interest in making the effective governance of a value chain a necessary
precondition for the lead firm. For example, in the OL3 scenario, the
FNRSA's mandate might be broadened so that the FNRSA could require
the use of appropriate value-chain governance mechanisms in nuclear
construction. 9 Such an intervention in private actors' freedom of
contract could be justifiable due to the safety interests related to
nuclear construction. When a regulatory actor is strategically located,
for example, in the jurisdiction where the end product is to be used,
such interventions can have a major effect even on actors in other
jurisdictions or on actors far removed from the lead firm in the contract
structure. In other cases, such as in relation to working conditions of
suppliers in foreign jurisdictions, regulatory intervention might be
justifiable, for example, through the development of a general state duty
to protect human rights. 100 This could then be used to require
businesses operating under such a duty to use adequate contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanisms to ensure that their
suppliers in other jurisdictions also comply with the relevant
requirements.
However, both these alternatives are inadequate when a lead firm's
or regulatory authority's interest is lacking. This is especially clear from
the events preceding the Bangladesh Accord. While the Bangladesh
Accord was a voluntary undertaking, it was implemented only in
response to a major catastrophe-turned-media-uproar. Similarly, in the
OL3 scenario, not only the lead firm but also the regulatory authority
would arguably have had the power to require effective governance but
did not do so.
Furthermore, it is probably impossible for any individual
governance mechanism to explicitly take into account all the interests of
involved actors ex ante. For example, the Bangladesh Accord covers one
99. One possible example is provided by the proposed U.K. energy sector contracts for
difference model contract, providing actors with standardized contract terms for example
in relation to dispute consolidation. See DEPT. OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, FIT
CONTRACT FOR DIFFERENCE: STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, 2014, 60 (U.K.),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/
file/267649/Generic CfD - Terms andConditions_518596495_17 1.pdf.
100. On such duties, see, for example, Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human
Rights Responsibilities' Become 'Duties. The Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that
Bind Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTs OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 271-94 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds.,
2013).
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narrow issue, fire and building safety, and some related questions (for
example, the effects that shutting down factories for repairs may have
on employees). This leaves untouched a wide range of other issues that
might be relevant from the perspective of how the lead firms should
govern the value chain in relation to working conditions. Similarly, the
regulator in OL3 extensively covered a range of security-related
standards but did not anticipate that the lead firm would choose a
method of governance that could harm the effective dissemination of
those standards. With regard to the German OEM, the general objective
of reducing the value chain's cost-structure is not restricted to a single
manner of implementation but requires instead a case-specific analysis
of the best approach in a given situation. While still limited, such an
open-ended approach in relation to implementation might be more
effective than the predefined and limited effects of the Bangladesh
Accord.
All this points to the limits of lead firms' and regulators' interests as
drivers of effective governance. Thus, legal liability for inadequate
governance may be desirable in order to guarantee that the interests of
value-chain actors are taken into account even when the governance
scheme undertaken by a lead firm is inadequate. The prospect of such
liability poses a number of questions, beginning with its grounds. This
will depend on the jurisdiction. If comparative fault is allowed in a
particular jurisdiction, for example, inadequate governance by the lead
firm might be seen as a factor contributing to damages caused by
another actor's breach of contract, thus potentially limiting the latter's
liability. Some other remedies might also prove relevant, such as finding
a contract unenforceable due to unconscionability'01 or the adjustment
of an unfair contract under Nordic contract law.102 The existence of at
101. For example, Ben-Shahar and White note that some of the American auto-OEM
supply chain contracts that they studied would probably have been unenforceable. See
Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 12, at 958.
102. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share an almost identical
contracts act, often referred to as the Nordic Contracts Act. Section 36 of Finland's Nordic
Contracts Act allows, in principle at least, the adjustment of unfair contracts for a range
of reasons. 36 § Laki varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista (1929:228) (Fin.),
translated in § 36 Contracts Act (1929:228) (Fin.), https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/
1929/en19290228.pdf. For brief English discussion on possible scenarios for adjusting
unfair contracts, see Herman Bruserud, Changed Circumstances, in THE NORDIC
CONTRACTS ACT: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF ITS ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY 59, 59-82
(Torgny HAstad ed., 2015); Johan Bdrlund, Protection of the Weaker Party in B2B
Relations in Nordic Contract Law, in THE NORDIC CONTRACTS ACT: ESSAYS IN
CELEBRATION OF ITS ONE HUNDREDTH ANNiVERsARY, supra at 83, 83-106; Hilde Hauge,
Unfair Contract Terms in Nordic Contract Law, in THE NORDIC CONTRACTS ACT: ESSAYS
IN CELEBRATION OF ITS ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY, supra at 157, 157-178; Jori
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least some level of contract-boundary-spanning overnance could also
result in a duty of care on the part of the lead firm to act so that its
standards are effectively disseminated throughout the chain or so that
its own actions do not negatively affect the implementation of the
standards. 103 In all these scenarios, it is extremely important to
precisely distinguish the factual situation of the case at hand from other
similar situations that typically do not give rise to liability.104 Thus the
typology proposed here for understanding contract-boundary-spanning
governance may prove useful in developing these theories of liability.
Further questions are posed by the nature of the legal relationship
between the different actors governed (or ungoverned) by a contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanism. The doctrine of privity of
contracts typically narrows a value-chain actor's possibilities for
bringing a claim to only those actors with whom it has a direct
contractual relationship. Those suffering from inadequate governance,
however, may be far removed from the lead firm in a chain of contracts.
Traditionally in such situations, the dispute moves along the chain from
one actor to another until it reaches the lead firm. For example, in the
OL3 scenario, the main contractor tried to resolve the issue of multiple
lawsuits by bringing a claim against the lead firm with whom it has a
direct contractual relationship, while at the same time trying to settle
claims from its own suppliers.105
Munukka, The Contractual Duty of Loyalty: Good Faith in the Performance and
Enforcement of Contracts, in THE NORDIC CONTRACTS ACT: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF ITS
ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY, supra at 203, 203-215.
103. This question has received considerable attention, for example, with regard to
whether and under what conditions codes of conduct impose legal duties on their drafters
in labor-rights-related cases. For forms of liability under tort, contract, and promissory
esteppel in the United States, see Joe Phillips & Suk-Jun Lim, Their Brothers' Keeper:
Global Buyers and the Legal Duty to Protect Suppliers' Employees, 61 RUTGERS L. REV.
333, 350-77 (2009). For tort law alternatives from a civil law perspective, see Cees van
Dam, Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms on the Role of Tort Law in the Area
of Business and Human Rights, 2 J. EUR. TORT L. 221, 231-34 (2011). For a comparison of
some forms of contract and tort liability between U.S., English, and Dutch law, see LOUISE
VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, CODES OF CONDUCT, CONTRACTS AND (AVOIDING) LIABILITY 61-115
(2015).
104. Phillips and Lim, van Dam, and Vytopil stress the importance of distinguishing the
factual situation of a case at hand for the applicability of the liability figures they discuss.
See sources cited supra note 103.
105. For anecdotal evidence from subcontractor interviews, see Aleksandra Kiskonen
and Jaakko Salminen, Loppuraportti: Ydinvoimalaitosprojektija sopimussuhteet (SOPU) -
projekti (Final Report of the Nuclear Construction and Contractual Relationships (SOPU)
project) from 30.10.2013 (Fin.) (on file with the author).
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This kind of chain litigation has its own problems, including high
costs as well as difficult questions of choice of law and proper venue (for
example whether a forum at one end of the chain can effectively take
into account factors related to a governance mechanism at the other end
of the chain). Furthermore, conflicts of interests may limit the
effectiveness of chain litigation if some actors are economically
dependent on the lead firm or otherwise unable to cooperate (for
example due to insolvency). A lead firm may also try to distance itself
from its subcontractors or suppliers, diminishing the publicity effects of
chain litigation when compared to a direct claim against a lead firm.
Finally, in cases like the Bangladesh Accord scenario, if it were not for
the dedicated governance contract that establishes privity between the
lead firms and the representatives of workers of Bangladeshi factories,
it might be practically impossible for workers or their representatives to
sue lead firms that are far removed not only in the chain of contracts
but also geographically, economically, and juridically. 106 In the next
section I examine in more detail the role of the doctrine of privity of
contracts for contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms.
III. CONTRACT-BOUNDARY-SPANNING GOVERNANCE AND THE DOCTRINE
OF PRIVITY
Contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms are used to
supplement chains or networks of contracts. They may exist as
independent agreements separate from the chain of contracts, as in the
case of the Bangladesh Accord, or they may be built into individual
contracts constituting the chain, as in the case of codes of conduct or
other contractual requirements that cascade from one bilateral contract
to the next. In either case, the governance mechanism should not be
seen as merely a chain structure. Instead, it is a means for some actors
in the chain to coordinate and control actors beyond their own contract
boundaries. As the examples discussed above show, this control can be
direct despite the ostensibly indirect legal relationship of actors far
removed from one another in a chain of contracts.
In effect, contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms can
be used to overcome some of the limits set by the privity of contracts in
a chain or network of contracts. Under the privity of contracts doctrine,
a contract creates rights and obligations that bind only the parties to it;
these rights and obligations have no force beyond the contract boundary
106. For discussion of a number of these issues, see van Dam supra note 103, at 228-
232.
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defined by privity. In some cases, however, contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanisms allow lead firms to control actors that are not
party to the same contract and so not in privity. Arguably, direct control
should entail the possibility of a direct legal relationship to prevent any
possible abuse of such direct control. More generally, contract-boundary-
spanning governance mechanisms are intertwined with their underlying
chain or network of bilateral contracts. The relationship between the
vernmentaloundary-spanning overnance mechanism and the chain or
network of contracts requires a reconceptualization of the legal
relationships between actors in this context.
Two questions arise with particular force. First, when bilateral
contractual relationships that form a chain or network of contracts are
supplemented by contract-boundary-spanning overnance, what is the
relationship between the two? Second, when an actor who does not have
a direct contractual connection to the lead firm (for example, through a
dedicated governance contract such as the Bangladesh Accord) is
nonetheless affected by the lead firm's governance choices, what is the
relationship between the two? These questions pose considerable
challenges and are largely beyond the scope of this paper. I will,
however, provide some outlines for resolving them.
First, Teubner's idea of selective attribution can be used to clarify
the issue of the relationship between a contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanism and the bilateral contracts of the chain or
network. 107 Selective attribution was proposed by Teubner in the
context of networked forms of economic cooperation, such as franchising,
just-in-time production, and virtual enterprises. Teubner recognizes
that networked forms of economic cooperation constitute multiple layers
of organization.108 On the one hand, network actors' relationships are
grounded in the logic of the bilateral contracts that are used to create
the founding relationships between network members. Disputes relating
to these can be resolved under traditional conceptions of privity in
relation to the individual contracts. On the other hand, network
members have subscribed their individual contracts to the logic of the
network as a whole. Disputes related to the level of the network
operating logic should be resolved in relation to the mechanisms the
107. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETZWERK ALS VERTRAGSVERBUND: VIRTUELLE
UNTERNEHMEN, FRANCHISING, JUST-IN-TIME IN SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHER UND
JURISTISCHER SICHT 137 (2004), translated in GUNTHER TEUBNER & HUGH COLLINS,
NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS 168 (Hugh Coflins ed., Michelle Everson trans.,
2011).
108. Id.
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parties have decided to use in incorporating the network logic. Some
disputes might involve both layers of organization.
The Bangladesh Accord can be used to concretize the idea of
selective attribution. The Bangladesh Accord is used to create an
additional layer of contract that directly connects actors who, when
examined from the level of the underlying chain of contracts, would not
normally be connected to the same bilateral contract. These two layers
are in a symbiosis with one another. If problems related to the whole
exist in a particular bilateral contractual relationship, the layer that
connects all the multiple actors and contracts helps find a solution. On
the other hand, the connecting layer would be meaningless without the
underlying contracts. Both layers complement one another. In cases of
disputes, however, the layers may intersect and intertwine in ways that
allow a dispute to be attributed to one or more bilateral contracts, the
governance mechanism, or both. Whether and how this attribution can
be done depends on the circumstances of a particular scenario and
applicable legal rules.
Having two layers of dedicated contracts, as under the Bangladesh
Accord example, makes the legal characterization of the different layers
relatively simple: both the layer of bilateral contracts and the layer of
the contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanism create
contractual relationships between their respective parties. While this
may not make it easy to sort out the conflicts related to overlapping
layers of contracts, it would help in the sense that the relationships
related to either of the layers could be characterized as contractual.
Problems may arise where not all value-chain members are party to the
governance contract. This seems to be the case under the Bangladesh
Accord. Suppose that a company owns a garment factory. The .company
is not party to a governance mechanism like the Bangladesh Accord but
is located beneath the lead firm in a contract chain, which is a party to
such a mechanism. The company ends up in a dispute with its workers.
The union that represents the workers is party to the same governance
mechanism as the lead firm. The dispute revolves around the effects of
the governance mechanism on workers. Would the company have
standing against other actors that are party to the governance
mechanism, such as the lead firm, and on the other hand, could the
union and the lead firm enforce the terms of the governance mechanism
against the company, who is not a party to it?
This leads to the second issue. How should the legal relationship
between actors be characterized if the contract-boundary-spanning
governance mechanism does not take the form of a dedicated
governance contract A la the Bangladesh Accord? In particular, what is
the legal relationship of actors that are not party to the same bilateral
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contract but nonetheless become involved in a dispute related to the
governance mechanism? Depending on jurisdiction and the
circumstances of the case, the legal relationship of the involved actors
might fit numerous different categorizations. These could include
implied contracts, tortious relationships, contracts to the benefit of third
parties, promissory estoppel, or extracontractual duties of good faith
that do not comfortably fit existing classifications of contract or tort. 109
One alternative is also simply to deny the existence of a legally relevant
relationship.
As one possible line of reasoning, I refer again to Teubner's work on
the legal categorization of networked forms of cooperation under
German law. Unlike the dedicated governance contract in the case of
the Bangladesh Accord, Teubner does not conceptualize the network-
level operating logic as necessarily an express or even implied
contract.'10 Instead, he argues that in networks of contracts duties of
good faith arise that may extend beyond the boundaries of an actor's
bilateral contracts to other network members. 111 For Teubner, the
general requirements for such duties of good faith are, first, that the
constituent contracts refer to one another (not that each contract has to
reference all the others but that references in the different contracts as
a whole cover the whole network); second, that the constituent contracts
refer to the existence of a shared network objective; and third, that
there exist contract-boundary-spanning factual cooperation between
network members. 112
While it depends on the exact content of the contracts and the
nature of the contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanism, the
German OEM example discussed above would seem to fulfill Teubner's
requirements. The "shared objective" would be cost-structure
optimization. In addition to references in contracts, the "value-chain
flow chart" that the lead firm gains provides a detailed reference of
relevant actors. Finally, in practice, there is contract-boundary-
spanning cooperation in the form of sharing cost information between
actors that are not party to the same bilateral contract. Teubner's model
109. See, for example, Phillips and Lim, supra note 103, for examples discussing
promissory estoppel, tortious relationships, and contracts to benefit third-parties. See also
VYTOPIL, supra note 103; TEUBNER, supra note 107, at 190-93, translated in TEU1NER &
COLLINS, supra note 107, at 213-18 (describing a number of possible approaches under
German and English law).
110. See TEUBNER, supra note 107, at 181-211, translated in TEUBNER & COLLINS,
supra note 107, at 207-34.
111. Id.
112. See TEUBNER, supra note 107, at 2 10-11, translated in TEUBNER & COLLINS, supra
note 107, at 233-34.
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might further be extrapolated to other cases, such as the different
approaches described by Locke.113 An ethical code of conduct might
similarly be seen as a shared objective. All contracts incorporating the
code of conduct explicitly refer to it, creating a system of references.
Finally, in Locke's examples, the level of factual cooperation would
range from compliance monitoring by a lead firm, as under traditional
compliance governance, to more extensive cooperation, as under
capability building. This is also where the typology presented by Gereffi,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon can clarify Teubner's framework by helping
distinguish different factual constellations in a way that enables
meaningful discussion over exactly what kind of factual cooperation is
required.
Within the limits of this paper I cannot go into the details of
Teubner's approach. Broadly speaking, however, it is squarely grounded
in German legal scholarship. The practical relevance of Teubner's
approach (or any other approach similarly grounded in a specific legal
system) and whether and how it might be translated into other legal
systems is uncertain. However, the three factual preconditions
identified by Teubner for networked contracts seem to capture crucial
aspects of contract-boundary-spanning overnance. When coupled with
the typology provided by Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, they might
prove useful as a descriptive and analytical tool for discussing the
preconditions for any legal effects that might be attributed to contract-
boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms, whatever the legal system.
This would provide a framework for discussing contract-boundary-
spanning governance in a legal context and make it easier for future
research to concentrate on the different legal forms and institutions
that, in different jurisdictions, might be relevant for understanding and
developing the law of contract-boundary-spanning governance. In
particular, by moving beyond the legal forms of individual jurisdictions,
it would help create a transnational legal discourse on what kind of
factual cooperation would be required for legal relationships that
overcome the doctrine of privity of contracts.
CONCLUSION: COLLECTIVE ENTITIES OF CONTRACTS AS NOVEL
REGULATORY SUBJECTIVITIES
In answer to the question of what legal effect should be given to
contract-boundary-spanning overnance mechanisms, I argue that some
measure of legal normativity requiring appropriate contract-boundary-
113. These were referred to in Section I.C supra.
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spanning governance for particular situations already exists. Take the
example of the Bangladesh Accord. Concern over brand image after the
Rana Plaza disaster was certainly the major reason for many Western
companies to commit to the Bangladesh Accord.114 Nonetheless, at least
some of the legal systems in which companies signatory to the
Bangladesh Accord operate have established fairness in contracting as a
key consideration in their laws of obligations. For example, the
proportionality of contractual relationships is an integral component of
contract law in the Nordic countries, where major Bangladesh Accord
signatories such as H&M are based.115 Similarly, the requirement of
good faith in contractual relationships under most legal systems where
Western signatories of the Bangladesh Accord are domiciled embodies
varying levels of mutuality that requires actors to take into account the
interests of their contractual counterparts.116
While the practical effects of such general principles as
proportionality or good faith in their respective legal systems are
diverse, difficult to systematize, and primarily intended for bilateral
relationships, they help set the stage for developments in contract-
boundary-spanning governance mechanisms.1 7 In particular, while a
global context obfuscates matters of choice of law, venue, and
enforceability in complex contractual structures, a lead firm based in a
country with a system of law that requires proportionality or good faith
in contractual relationships cannot fully insulate itself from legal
questions arising out of the effects that its own contrary practices may
have on its production chain. From this perspective, and assuming a
critical stance, a mechanism such as the Bangladesh Accord might be
construed in part as a protective measure aimed at establishing limits
to liability from claims related to inadequate governance of a lead firm
vis-A-vis its production chain. For example, the Bangladesh Accord
guarantees the wages of a Bangladeshi worker for a six-month grace
period. Conceivably, a lead firm's actions under the accord could result
114. See Section II.A supra.
115. See sources cited supra note 102.
116. For a general discussion of some aspects of good faith in Western European
jurisdictions, see Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faith in European
Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW 7, 7-62 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000), and for a discussion
with reference to the United States, see Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualisation of
Good Faith in American Contract Law: A General Account, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 118, 118-41.
117. Teubner's monograph, supra note 107, provides one such approach that is
ultimately based on two German judgments concerning the contract-boundary-spanning
effects of contracts in a business-to-business context.
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in a longer-term loss of a worker's livelihood, which might prove
devastating from a Bangladeshi worker's perspective. Arguably, the
Bangladesh Accord limits claims for such damages.
This hypothesis should not be understood to diminish any beneficial
effects of various private governance measures, such as the Bangladesh
Accord. Instead, it is a call for more research toward understanding how
existing systems of laws of obligations in countries in which lead firms
are based cope with and shape globally positioned collective entities of
contracts that are governed by one or more specific actors. Law's
relationship to these new regulatory subjectivities, collective entities of
contracts governed by one or more actors in an uncertain legal
framework, needs to be uncovered to ensure the more effective
regulation of globally-fragmented production. The preliminary typology
provided in this paper helps achieve the objective of mapping legal
effects to specific forms of contract-boundary-spanning overnance.
